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Retail chains and imports from developing countries have grown sharply over the
past 25 years. Wal-Mart’s chain, which currently accounts for 10% of U.S. im-
ports from China, grew 10-fold and its sales 90-fold over this period, while U.S.
imports from China increased 30-fold. We relate these trends using a model in
which scale economies in retail interact with scale economies in the import pro-
cess. Combined, these scale economies amplify the eﬀects of technological change
and trade liberalization. Falling trade barriers increase imports not only through
direct reduction of input costs but also through an expanded chain and higher
investment in technology. This mechanism can explain why a surge in U.S. im-
ports followed relatively modest tariﬀ reductions and why Wal-Mart abandoned
its “Buy American” campaign in the 1990s. Also consistent with these facts, we
show that tariﬀ reductions have a greater eﬀect the more advanced the retailer’s
technology. The model has implications for the pace of the product cycle and
sheds light on the recent apparent acceleration in foreign outsourcing.
JEL Codes: L11, L81, F12
Keywords: Wal-Mart, Trade, Economies of Scale, China, Technological Change,
Retail Chain
∗Comments welcome to: emek@missouri.edu and pham@missouri.edu. We thank Daron Acemoglu, Saku
Aura, Bengte Evenson, Gary Gereﬃ, Guy Michaels, Peter Mueser, John Romalis, John Stevens, Ken Swin-
nerton, Vitor Trindade, Xinghe Wang, Jeﬀ Wilder, and seminar participants at the Universities of Missouri,
Kentucky, and Nevada – Las Vegas, the Federal Reserve Board of Governors and the 2005 Missouri Economic
Conference and 2005 NEUDC for comments. Any remaining errors are our own.1 Introduction
In this paper, we study the relationship between the structure of retail markets in the U.S.
and the location of manufacturing jobs. The most striking change in retail markets over
the past 25 years has been an increase in the size and prevalence of “big box” chains,
most spectacularly among them Wal-Mart, which has experienced a ten-fold growth in the
number of stores. Imports from developing countries have also increased dramatically over
this period; China’s imports to the U.S. expanded 30-fold in real terms. Wal-Mart’s imports
have increased even faster: the chain now accounts for nearly 10% of U.S. imports from
China, and a much larger fraction of consumer-goods imports from China. We present a
theory that links these trends and show that there is a two-way relationship between the size
of a dominant retailer and imports of consumer goods. The model can explain a number
of observed patterns, including the concurrent and accelerating expansion of Wal-Mart and
U.S. imports from China despite only modest reductions in trade barriers, and the collapse
of Wal-Mart’s “Buy American” campaign in the early 1990s.
The claim has been made repeatedly in the popular press that Wal-Mart imports more
than other retailers and that its purchasing patterns have inﬂuenced the location of manu-
facturing jobs. A 2003 Pulitzer Prize-winning series on Wal-Mart in the Los Angeles Times
claimed that “Wal-Mart is so powerful that it moves the economies of entire countries, bring-
ing proﬁt and pain,” and, more speciﬁcally, that Wal-Mart “has hastened the ﬂight of U.S.
manufacturing jobs overseas” (Goldman and Cleeland (2003)). A 2004 PBS documentary
focused on the “clash between the interests of Americans as workers and the desires of
Americans as consumers” inherent in Wal-Mart’s “everyday low prices.”1 Less ominously,
the Economist argues that “the emergence of China as a centre of low-cost production is
playing to [Wal-Mart’s] strengths” (The Economist (2004)). While other chains may also
contribute to the increase in imports, we focus on Wal-Mart because it has become the
1See http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/walmart/etc/synopsis.html.canonical example of a large retail chain.
We model the relationship between chain size and imports as an interaction between
economies of scale in retailing and economies of scale in the import process. There are
two types of ﬁrms in the retail sector: a single large chain retailer with superior “chaining”
technology in the form of lower costs of logistics and distribution, and many “stand-alone”
(fringe) retailers. All retailers purchase their wares from competitive input markets, but
the chain has a cost advantage due to scale economies in marketing. A second source of
economies of scale arises because there are two input markets, one domestic and one foreign,
and there is a ﬁxed cost associated with purchasing the input from the foreign market. As
a result, small retailers purchase the input domestically, at a higher cost, even when the
chain purchases it oﬀshore. These eﬀects combine to generate an equilibrium that depends
on the chain’s technological advantage, and, therefore, its size. As the chain expands, its
unit input cost falls; the lower retail price increases quantity demanded. When the chain
becomes suﬃciently large it switches from domestic to oﬀshore suppliers. The movement of
production overseas reduces unit production cost, and increases the chain’s proﬁt per store,
giving the retailer further incentive to expand.
The relationship between these dual scale economies ampliﬁes the eﬀect of trade liberal-
ization on import volume. A lower tariﬀ not only expands imports through the usual eﬀect
on price but also causes the retailer to expand the chain. The expanded chain brings imports
to more locations and reduces the retailer’s cost, causing a further expansion of the market
for imports. Accounting for these additional eﬀects due to the chain’s expansion increases
the eﬀective elasticity of demand for imports relative to standard models that only consider
the direct eﬀect of a tariﬀ reduction. If the retailer’s chaining technology is the outcome of
deliberate and costly investment lower trade barriers have an additional eﬀect: by increasing
proﬁt per store lower trade barriers increase the chain’s optimal level of investment in the
technology, which results in an even larger chain and an even greater increase in imports.
Our model can explain the observed nonlinear relationship between tariﬀ reductions and
2trade volume noted by, among others, Yi (2003), Romalis (2005), and Ruhl (2003). In the
case of China, a large tariﬀ reduction with the granting of Most Favored Nation status in
1980 had relatively little eﬀect on exports to the U.S., while modest tariﬀ reductions in later
years have generated much larger increases in exports. The rise of Wal-Mart and other retail
chains helps to resolve this puzzle: in our model, the eﬀect of trade liberalization on import
volume is greater the more advanced the retail chaining technology and the larger the retail
chain.
When we generalize the model to consider many possible foreign production locations
(countries), we ﬁnd that the pace of technological change in the retail sector determines
the pace of the product cycle. As the retailer’s technology improves production moves from
location to location, either within or across countries. The “migration” of manufacturing
jobs across countries induces the chain to grow even more, magnifying the chain’s eﬀect on
import volume. Because of this chain eﬀect, trade liberalization in an importing country
that aﬀects all its (current and potential) trading partners equally can cause production
to shift from one country to another. Thus, greater potential access to an export market
can reduce a country’s exports if the same measure also increases competition from other
countries. This result is consistent with the sentiment of some developing economies that
industries are being lost to China (see, for instance, Moreira (2004)) over a period when U.S.
import tariﬀ rates have declined at similar rates for these countries.
Our focus on the retail chain, rather than an individual store, allows us to broaden the
discussion of the impact of technological change. The technological innovations we consider
— reductions in the cost of operating multi-store chains such as logistics and distribution
costs — are closely tied with bar-code technology (and, more recently, radio frequency iden-
tiﬁcation (RFID) technology), whose eﬀect on store size is considered by Holmes (2001).2
Because our chain store makes choices about its suppliers, it has an eﬀect not only on the
2Indeed, the increase in chain size in the past two decades has coincided with a sharp rise in store size
(Jarmin, Klimek, and Miranda (2005)).
3retail markets it serves but also on the location of manufacturing jobs and, through them,
on the aggregate economy. While Wal-Mart, as the largest retail chain in the U.S. and the
world, serves as the main motivation in our model, other chains have also expanded in recent
decades. The expansion of these smaller retail chains has probably also contributed to the
recent growth in imports (especially from China). Even in these latter cases, the relationship
is likely to be driven by the same economic mechanism we highlight in this paper.
Both the expansion of the chain, which has lower prices than stand-alone retailers, and
the shift of production to cheaper overseas locations expand market size. Both trends also
feed on this larger market. The idea that market size aﬀects production patterns, which
dates back Adam Smith (1776), has been studied extensively in the trade literature.3 We
build on it using a model similar to Jones and Kierzkowski (1990) in which production is
described as a set of blocks linked to form a supply chain. Outsourcing a production block
entails a ﬁxed linking cost, so the size of the market determines the extent of outsourcing.4,5
In our model, the extent of outsourcing also aﬀects the size of the market, operating through
the chain store.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some basic
facts about the recent growth of chains and imports that serve as background to our model.
Section 3 describes the basic model and analyzes the eﬀects of technological change and
trade liberalization. Section 4 endogenizes the retailer’s investment in chaining technology,
and shows that the level of investment depends on trade policy. Section 5 analyzes the
relationship between the retail chain, trade policy and the product cycle. Section 6 concludes.
3See for example Helpman and Krugman (1985), Ethier (1979), Belassa (1967).
4See also Wan (2004) and Long, Riezman, and Souberyan (2005) for models extending this idea.
5To focus on the main issues of this paper we ignore the distinctions among the diﬀerent forms these
links can assume, i.e., whether the foreign producer is a subsidiary, subcontractor, or independent exporter,
etc. Several recent papers have examined these contractual arrangements in more detail (see Antr` as (2003),
Antr` as and Helpman (2004), Grossman and Helpman (2002a,b)). Of particular interest for our context is
Feenstra and Hanson’s (2005) study of outsourcing in China.
42 Background: Chains and Imports
Retail chains have grown dramatically over the past half-century, while stand-alone (“mom-
and-pop”) retailers have been declining. A recent study of establishment-level data from
the Census Bureau covering the period 1975-2000 shows that retail chains were the driving
force behind the growth in the number of retail stores and the sole source of growth in retail
employment over this period. Among retail chains, national chains grew the fastest (Jarmin,
Klimek, and Miranda (2005)).
Table 2 shows the increase in the size and dominance of chains over the period 1948-
1997. In the ﬁrst three columns we compute, respectively, the fraction of retail ﬁrms that
operate chains, the share of all retail stores that belong to chains, and chains’ share of all
retail sales. All three measures rise over time, with a distinct rise in the share of chain stores
since the early 1970s. In the last three columns we compute the same three measures but for
large chains (with 100 or more stores) relative to all chains; large chains have been gaining
market share relative to smaller chains throughout this period.
This trend may be explained by advances in technology that increasingly raise chains’
cost advantage over stand-alone retailers. Although available measures of productivity and
eﬃciency for the retail industry are relatively poor, chains appear to be more productive than
stand-alone retailers and they invest more in information technology (IT) (Doms, Jarmin,
and Klimek (2004)). Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2002) show that the bulk of productiv-
ity growth in the U.S. retail sector in the 1990s came from the expansion of more-productive
retail chains and the contraction and exit of less-productive retailers, and that the retail sec-
tor exhibits large and persistent productivity diﬀerences across establishments within narrow
(4-digit) industries.
Wal-Mart is the largest retail chain in the United States (and the world). The chain
has expanded steadily since opening its ﬁrst store in Rogers, Arkansas, in 1962; by 2004, it
had more than 3000 stores in all 50 states and about 800,000 employees in the U.S., and
accounted for 7% of all U.S. retail sales. Figure 1 shows U.S. Wal-Mart sales in real 2002
5dollars over the period 1978-2004 as a thick-set line (using the right-hand axis). Figure 2
separates Wal-Mart’s sales growth since 1985 into two components: the rise in the number
of Wal-Mart stores (solid line, left axis) and sales per store (dotted line, right axis). Since
part of the growth in sales per store has been fueled by the rise of the “Supercenter” format
which includes a full line of groceries, we also compute, starting in 1997, sales per store
excluding grocery sales.6
Wal-Mart’s technological prowess, its zealous cost-cutting, and its propensity to import
have all received much attention in popular discourse. Feiner, O’Andraia, Black, Jones,
and Konik (2002) cite Wal-Mart’s “use of technology for merchandising, distribution and
replenishment” as its main advantage over other retailers (p. 217). A study by McKinsey
Global Institute (2001) attributes much of the acceleration in productivity growth in the
1990s to Wal-Mart, and Holmes (2001) and Bagwell, Ramey, and Spulber (1997) also cite
evidence that Wal-Mart is a leading investor in IT. In 1990, Wal-Mart introduced a tech-
nological innovation, Retail Link: software connecting its stores, distribution centers, and
suppliers, providing detailed inventory data “to bring our suppliers closer to our individual
stores” (Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1991, p. 3). Many industry observers credit Wal-Mart’s
subsequent dominance in the retail sector to this innovation (see, for example, Abernathy,
Dunlop, Hammond, and Weil (1999)).
While Wal-Mart’s main advantage over its rivals appears to be in logistics and dis-
tribution (in the language of our model, it has a superior “chaining” technology), it also
beneﬁts, like other chains, from a lower eﬀective unit input cost. Most small retailers make
their purchases of national brands through intermediaries, either traditional wholesalers or
manufacturers’ representatives. Wal-Mart and other retailers that handle large quantities
enjoy economies of scale because they can purchase directly from manufacturers. Although
manufacturers are required to sell at the same price to all their customers, in practice large
6The share of sales due to groceries has been reported since 1997 in Wal-Mart’s 10-K ﬁlings.
6retailers pay lower unit input costs. One common mechanism that generates these lower
costs is manufacturers’ practice of “reimbursing” large buyers for marketing expenses the
retailers incur to promote their products. Our impression from conversations with retail
industry insiders is that these payments depend more on the number of units a retailer sells
than on any actual costs incurred; the per-unit “reimbursement” increases with the size of
the retailer. There is much anecdotal evidence that Wal-Mart’s unit input costs have been
declining over time; the magazine Fast Company reported in 2003 that for “basic products
that don’t change, the price Wal-Mart will pay, and will charge shoppers, must drop year
after year” (Fishman (2003)). While there are other possible explanations for this policy,
lower transactions costs provide an economically-plausible explanation that is consistent with
increased sales volume.
In 1985, Wal-Mart launched a popular and well-publicized “Buy American” campaign,
pledging to “buy American whenever we can,” and to pay up to a 5% premium for U.S.-made
goods (Zellner (1992)). In late 1992, however, Dateline NBC aired a segment charging that
Wal-Mart was producing private-label clothes in Bangladesh, smuggling Chinese garments
into the U.S. in excess of U.S. quotas, and placing imported clothes on racks marked “Made
in the USA” (Gladstone (1992)). References to the “Buy American” campaign disappeared
from both the popular press and Wal-Mart’s publications by early 1993.7 In the context
of our model, Wal-Mart’s abandonment of its “Buy American” campaign can be attributed
to its expansion over the course of the campaign from 859 to 1880 stores, possibly passing
a pass a threshold size beyond which purchasing inputs domestically was no longer proﬁt
maximizing.
Concurrent with Wal-Mart’s expansion, U.S. imports from the rest of the world, and
7Wal-Mart referred to its “Buy American” campaign as “a key philosophy of our buying divisions” in its
1987 annual report (p. 8), and reiterated its commitment to “‘Buy American’ in every possible situation”
in the 1989 annual report (p. 2). By 1994, the annual report stated (p. 6), “We wish that everything we
sell was made in the United States. Today this isn’t possible, but we are going to keep trying” (Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. (various years)).
7from less-developed countries (LDCs) in particular, have surged. Between 1984 and 2004,
U.S. imports from China increased more than 30-fold in real terms. Imports from China
are shown in Figure 1 as a thin solid line, using the right-hand axis, on the same scale as
U.S. Wal-Mart sales.8 The emergence of “private label” (store-brand) apparel that competes
directly with U.S. apparel manufacturing, and global sourcing of apparel production, also
coincided with these trends (Gereﬃ (1999)). This rise in imports has occurred while import
tariﬀs on Chinese goods have fallen only modestly. The only sharp decline occurred in 1980,
when China was granted Most Favored Nation (MFN) status with the U.S.; since then,
tariﬀs on Chinese goods have fallen gradually, as part of the general reduction in MFN (now
Normal Trade Relations) rates. The dotted line in Figure 1 shows, on the left-hand axis,
the average (unweighted) U.S. tariﬀ rate applicable to products exported from China for the
period 1978-2000.9
Many observers have speculated on a link between these concurrent trends in the retail
and import sectors. Early on, Wal-Mart and a few other retailers provided the only link
between Asian manufacturers and the American market (Petrovic and Hamilton (2005));
Gereﬃ (1999) argues that the growth of “high volume, low cost discount chains,” including
Wal-Mart, has ampliﬁed global sourcing (pp. 44-45). Wal-Mart’s import volume is not
publicly available, but some ﬁgures have been cited in the popular press. Lahart (2005)
reports that Wal-Mart accounted for approximately $18 billion in goods imports from China
in ﬁscal 2004 implying that Wal-Mart alone is responsible for roughly 10% of U.S. imports
from China; about half of this amount refers to direct imports, the rest coming through
its suppliers (The Economist (2004)).10 Others estimate that 80% of Wal-Mart’s global
8This ﬁgure uses the ﬁnished-goods Producer Price Index to deﬂate nominal import values from the U.S.
Bureau of Economic Analysis. The true growth rate is probably even larger, because the composition of
imports from China is skewed towards items, like apparel and toys, whose prices have been falling relative
to the overall price level.
9We thank John Romalis for providing these data from Romalis (2005). Figures for 2001-2004 are not
available but do not include any sharp breaks.
10Since a large share of U.S. imports from China are intermediate goods, Wal-Mart’s share of consumer
goods’ imports is substantially higher.
8suppliers are located in China (Goodman and Pan (2004)), and that 70% of its products are
made in China (Jiang (2004)).11
A look at the relationship between apparel price inﬂation and Wal-Mart’s market share
also suggests that Wal-Mart imports disproportionately more than other apparel sellers.
Using annual data on consumer price inﬂation in the apparel sector for 23 metropolitan
areas (∆Pit, with i indexing the location and t indexing year), import price inﬂation at the
national level (∆P m
t ), and Wal-Mart’s market share (WMshareit) over a 19-year period, we
estimate
∆Pit = β1 + β2∆P
m
t + β3WMshareit + β4∆P
m
t · WMshareit + εit. (1)
The results are shown in Table 1 for two diﬀerent measures of import price inﬂation.12 For
each measure, we report in the ﬁrst column results from regressions include only import price
inﬂation (no covariates); we ﬁnd a positive and statistically signiﬁcant relationship between
the two inﬂation rates: 1-point increase in apparel import price inﬂation corresponds to a
0.4-0.5 point increase in apparel consumer price inﬂation. In the second column, we add
Wal-Mart’s market share and the interaction term. The direct eﬀect of Wal-Mart is to
reduce apparel inﬂation, consistent with the common perception that Wal-Mart’s presence
serves as a discipline device for costs.13 The coeﬃcient on the interaction term is positive:
increasing Wal-Mart’s market share from 1% to 2% — an increase of 10 stores, on average
— nearly doubles the sensitivity of consumer price inﬂation to import price inﬂation. Such
an eﬀect implies that the import share of apparel sales at Wal-Mart stores is substantially
higher than at the average apparel retailer.14
11This last ﬁgure is almost certainly exaggerated, but the increase in the chain’s import share of sales is
not disputed.
12The data are described in full in Appendix B.
13As noted by Hausman and Leibtag (2004), the BLS’s correction for sampling changes biases the indices
against exhibiting a “Wal-Mart eﬀect.”
14Wal-Mart’s market share is measured with error, since the number of stores in the denominator is not
weighted by their sales share, and we do not control for the existence of other large chain retailers which
may also import disproportionately to their size. These problems bias us against ﬁnding an eﬀect, however,
so the estimated eﬀect is probably a lower bound on the eﬀect of large chains on apparel imports.
9These results are not deﬁnitive, but they are strongly suggestive that Wal-Mart’s pres-
ence is associated with a higher level of imports in an MSA, and they are consistent with
the common perception that Wal-Mart acts as a catalyst to greater imports and increased
global sourcing. In the next section, we suggest a mechanism that can generate this eﬀect.
3 Model
3.1 Domestic Production
Our basic model has two sectors: a retail sector and a manufacturing sector. We describe
each in turn.
There are N locations or retail markets (N large), which are ex ante identical. Each
location is served by a monopolist retailer selling a single consumption good.15 Market
demand in each location, x, is downward-sloping with demand at p = 0 equal to ¯ x < ∞.
The price charged by the monopolist in market is constrained by potential entrants who can
enter costlessly and instantaneously.
We assume that most retailers, including all potential entrants, can only operate stand-
alone stores.16 There exists one retailer with access to “chaining technology”: this retailer
can operate a chain of k ≥ 1 stores at a cost
c(k)
δ if k > 1, where δ > 0 is a technology
parameter and c(·) is increasing and convex.17 We think of c(k) as capturing the costs of
adding truck routes, distribution center inventory, etc.; access to this technology is the only
exogenous diﬀerence between the chain and other retailers. The motivation for a positive
second derivative on c(·) is that each additional store is accommodated by re-optimizing
distribution facilities, inventory management and trucking routes, and this process becomes
15The assumption that retailers are local monopolists is only for convenience. Bertrand competition among
two retailers in a single location would achieve the same outcome.
16This is consistent with the recent Censuses of Retail Trade, which shows that 95% or more of U.S.
retailers operate a single establishment (store). See Table 2.
17Formally, c(1) = c0(1) = 0, c0 > 0 for k > 1, c00 > 0.
10increasingly complex — and costly — as the network expands.18 In addition, without convex
chaining costs, nothing would keep the chain from expanding to take over all retail locations;
this scenario is both unrealistic and uninteresting from our point of view. The technology
parameter δ captures Wal-Mart’s advantage over other retailers in chaining technology: if δ
is very high, then the cost of chaining is very low. We begin by treating δ as exogenous; we
later endogenize it to capture the retailer’s investment decision.19
The retailer’s role is to buy the consumption good from a manufacturer or wholesaler and
sell it to consumers. The retailer’s unit input cost consists of two elements: the consumption
good’s “free on board” (FOB) price and a marketing cost.20 The consumption good is
produced by a competitive market using a constant-returns production technology with
marginal cost α. Retailers also need to incur a marketing cost to sell their products. Each
retailer has access to two marketing technologies, one linear and one convex. For a retailer
with k ≥ 1 stores, each of which sells x ≥ 0 units, the linear technology has total marketing
cost hkx where h > 0 is a constant. Alternatively, retailers can use a convex marketing
technology; this alternative has total cost of S(kx) > 0, with S(·) increasing but concave.
Since retailers choose the lower-cost option for a given (k,x), the eﬀective marketing cost is
min{hkx,S(kx)}. The two technologies are depicted graphically in Figure 3. We deﬁne z
implicitly by hz = S(z), so a retailer uses the linear technology iﬀ kx ≤ z, and the convex
technology otherwise. We assume that z > ¯ x where ¯ x < ∞ is the quantity demanded in
a single location if p = 0.21 The linear technology, with the condition on z, ensures that
18Holmes (2005) explicitly models the expansion pattern of Wal-Mart, with a focus on “economies of
density” — the cost-savings achieved when stores are located near one another. We abstract from that issue
here, treating all locations as symmetric with respect to one another.
19Allowing only one retailer to have access to chaining technology enables us to focus on the role of a
single chain in the import process, while simplifying the constraints in the chain’s optimization problem
below. Alternatively, other retailers may have the same technology but values of δ small enough to preclude
chaining (operating more than one store).
20Our analysis would not change if retailing technology involved two or more inputs, used in ﬁxed pro-
portions, if those inputs were supplied by a competitive market. We do, however, abstract from any cost
advantages the chain may have in other inputs.
21This implies that S0(0) > h, i.e., that for small kx the convex technology has higher marginal cost than
11small retailers have MC = AC and so make zero proﬁt by charging the competitive price.
Because z > ¯ x, only the chain has a potential for declining marginal cost.22
Combining the production and marketing components, the total input cost for a retailer
of size k is αkx + min{hkx, S(kx)}. Since a stand-alone retailer maximizes proﬁt in a
single location, where demand can never be large enough to justify the convex marketing
technology, its minimized cost is x(α+h). The contestable-market assumption implies that
a stand-alone retailer cannot charge a price above (α+h); let xs > 0 be demand at p = α+h.
The chain retailer faces a more complex problem: it must simultaneously choose its size
(number of stores) and quantity (equivalently, price) in each location. Formally, it solves
max
k,x
π(k,x) = kx(p(x) − α) − min{hkx,S(kx)} −
c(k)
δ
subject to k ∈ [1,N]
x ≥ 0
p(x) ≤ α + h (2)
where p(x) is the inverse demand function. The ﬁrst constraint is on chain size, which
cannot fall below 1 and cannot exceed the total number of locations in the economy.23 The
second constraint is on the number of units sold per store, which cannot be negative. The
third constraint is the contestable-market constraint: the chain retailer cannot charge a price
higher than a potential (stand-alone) entrant would charge. To simplify this problem, we
the linear technology. Also, S0(z),h, so a retailer’s marginal cost falls discretely when the chain reaches the
threshold size z.
22As an empirical observation, small retailers tend to purchase through intermediaries while large retailers
tend to be vertically integrated. Consistent with this observation, Basker (2005a) ﬁnds that the opening
of a new Wal-Mart store is associated with an increase in retail employment but a decrease in wholesale
employment at the county level.
23Since c(1) = c0(1) = 0, the chain can always emulate a stand-alone retailer and earn zero proﬁt. For
the most part, we assume that the upper limit N on k does not bind. This seems reasonable as a ﬁrst
approximation: although Wal-Mart currently has more than 3,000 stores in the U.S. alone, its expansion
plan suggests there is plenty more room for it to grow. Wal-Mart’s plans for 2005 include opening at least
120 new stores (Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (2004)). We also ignore integer problems in the solution k∗.
12redeﬁne p(x) to be the inverse residual demand function at a location, replacing p(x) = α+h
for x ≤ xs, where xs is quantity demanded at p = α + h.
Using this transformation, if a solution (k∗,x∗) exists with k∗ ·x∗ ≤ z, it will satisfy the
ﬁrst-order conditions





0(x)x + p(x) − α − h) = 0. (4)
Equations (3) and (4) have a unique solution, (k∗,x∗) = (1,xs). This solution guarantees
zero proﬁt because the chain is emulating a stand-alone retailer with the same cost and
revenue.
Alternatively, if an interior solution (k∗,x∗) exists such that k∗ ·x∗ > z — i.e., the chain
is large enough to use the increasing-returns marketing technology — it must satisfy the
ﬁrst-order conditions






0(x)x + p(x) − α − S
0(kx)) = 0. (6)
This interior solution dominates (k,x) = (1,xs) if and only if it yields a positive proﬁt. We
show the second-order conditions for an interior solution and derive suﬃcient conditions for
existence and uniqueness of the solution in Appendix A.
We write the global solution to Equations (3) and (5) as k∗(x), and the global solution
to Equations (4) and (6) as x∗(k). Figure 4 shows the determination of x∗(k). The marginal
revenue line is shown as two thick-set segments. The ﬁrst, horizontal at p = α + h, shows
that marginal revenue is constant for x ≤ xs; the second segment is downward sloping, since
a retailer selling more than xs units faces a downward-sloping demand curve. (The demand
curve shown is p = a − bx.) A family of marginal cost curves is shown as thin lines, each
13for a diﬀerent value of chain size, k. Since the linear marketing technology is more eﬃcient
if and only if x < z
k, each marginal cost curve has two segments: for x < z
k, marginal cost
is constant at α + h; and for x ≥ z
k, marginal cost is declining, α + S0(kx). Since S0 > 0
and S00 < 0, increasing k rotates the marginal cost curve clockwise around α + S0(0). The
threshold value ¯ k is deﬁned as the highest value of k for which x∗(k) = xs, i.e., sales per
store are still constrained by potential entrants.24 We assume that ¯ k < N, where N is the
total number of locations. Graphically, at ¯ k, the marginal cost curve α + S0(¯ kx) crosses the
top of the downward-sloping segment of the marginal revenue curve. For all higher values of
k, such as k2 > ¯ k in the ﬁgure, x∗(k) > xs and price is below α + h.
Since (k∗,x∗) = (1,xs) guarantees zero proﬁt, the chain chooses the interior solution
only if it yields positive proﬁt. Whether the corner or interior solution dominates depends
on the technology parameter δ; the solution is unique in all but a knife-edge case. Figures 5
and 6 show, for two diﬀerent values of δ, the simultaneous determination of (k∗(x),x∗(k)).
In each ﬁgure, the curve k∗(x) is shown as the thick-set solid line and x∗(k) as the thin solid
line. The hyperbola kx = z marks the boundary above which k∗(x) is given by Equation
(5), and below which it is given by Equation (3).
The curve k∗(x) shows the optimal chain size for every possible value of x, the number of
units sold per store. If x is small, the chain has to be very large to enjoy the scale economies
derived from the convex marketing technology; but a larger chain size is associated with a
large (and increasing) chaining cost. Thus for small values of x the optimal chain size is
k∗ = 1. As x increases, the chain size k needed to switch to the convex marketing technology
falls, and eventually justiﬁes the chaining cost
c(k)
δ .
The thinner curve x∗(k) shows the optimal number of units sold per store for every
possible chain size k ∈ [1,N]. If k, the chain size, is small, x∗(k) = xs: the chain sells the
same number of units per store (at the same retail price) as a stand-alone store. For small k,
24¯ k solves S0(¯ kxs) = h + p0(xs)xs where p0(xs) refers to downward-sloping segment of the demand curve.
14marginal cost and marginal revenue associated with an increase in x are both α+h because
the linear marketing technology is more eﬃcient than the convex marketing technology. As
k increases, the convex marketing technology becomes optimal, and the chain’s marginal
cost falls below α+h; however, for k ≤ ¯ k, marginal revenue remains α+h because potential
entry by stand-alones constrains the chain’s monopoly price. Only for k > ¯ k does x∗(k) start
increasing beyond xs. Note also that ¯ k > z
xs: at k = z
xs, the chain switches from the linear
to the convex marketing technology, and begins to earn an operating proﬁt per store, but
the price constraint imposed by potential entrants still binds.
Figure 5 depicts the case where δ, the chain’s technology parameter, is low, so the cost
of operating multiple stores is high. As a result, k∗(x) = 1 for a large set of possible values
of x. The unique equilibrium in this case is the corner solution (k∗,x∗) = (1,xs): the chain
operates a single store, emulating a stand-alone and earning zero proﬁt. In Figure 6, δ is
higher; this parameter change does not alter the curve x∗(k), but it aﬀects k∗(x) in two ways:
it reduces the range of x for which the corner solution k∗(x) = 1 dominates, and it rotates the
curve k∗(x;δ) satisfying the interior ﬁrst-order condition (Equation (5)) clockwise, increasing
the optimal value of k for values of x where k∗(x) > 1. The new equilibrium features a higher
k∗ as well as a higher x∗: the chain operates multiple stores and sells more units per store
(at a lower retail price) than would a stand-alone store.
Let (k∗(δ),x∗(δ)) be the (global) solution to the chain’s optimization problem for a given
value of δ, and deﬁne δc to be the smallest value of δ for which the retailer operates a chain:
i.e., the value of δ at which interior solution generates zero proﬁt. We show in Appendix A
that for δ > δc, dk∗
dδ > 0 and dx∗
dδ > 0. This implies that the chain’s retail price p(x) falls
when δ increases, while the chain’s total value of sales — measured as kxp(x) — increases.
There is much evidence that Wal-Mart’s chaining technology has improved over time.
In 1969, the company installed a computer in its ﬁrst distribution center; by the late 1970s a
computer network linked all Wal-Mart stores and distribution centers to company headquar-
ters. Bar-code technology was added in all distribution centers by the late 1980s (Feiner,
15O’Andraia, Black, Jones, and Konik (2002)). If δ increases slowly over time, starting from a
low level, the retailer operates a stand-alone until its size increases discretely at δc. As the
ﬁrm’s technology parameter increases beyond δc its optimal size continues to increase. The
fact that chain size increases in δ only once the retailer’s chaining technology has passed some
threshold value implies that even if many retailers had access to some chaining technology,
with a continuous distribution of δ, the observed mass point at k = 1 (see Table 2) would
remain.
3.2 Foreign Production
We now suppose that the consumption good can be manufactured either domestically or
oﬀshore (and imported) and derive both the conditions under which the chain chooses to
import the good and the consequences of this choice.
Assume for simplicity that there are two possible production locations (domestic and
foreign); we allow for a continuum of possible production locations in Section 5. In each lo-
cation there is a large number of identical manufacturers with a constant-returns production
technology, and pricing is competitive. We now write the domestic manufacturing sector’s
competitive price as α0. The foreign manufacturing sector has lower marginal cost (and
therefore FOB price) e α1  α0, but there is a transportation cost (normalized to zero for the
domestically-produced good) and tariﬀ that sum to τ per unit. We deﬁne α1 ≡ e α1 +τ < α0
to be the marginal cost of production and delivery (exclusive of marketing) if the good is
produced oﬀshore.
In addition to the production and transportation cost/tariﬀ, a retailer purchasing input
from a foreign manufacturer must pay a positive ﬁxed cost F. This ﬁxed cost includes
the cost of setting up a production facility or a relationship with a producer in a foreign
country, or a network of buyers such as the one that Wal-Mart has in China, and possibly
16any non-pecuniary costs such as backlash from domestic residents.25 We assume that the
retailer, and not the manufacturer, bears the cost F for several reasons. First, as mentioned
earlier, approximately 50% of Wal-Mart’s imports are direct imports through its contracts
with foreign manufacturers. In these cases, it seems reasonable to assume that Wal-Mart
bears any ﬁxed cost.26 In a careful micro-level analysis of trading ﬁrms, Bernard, Jensen,
and Schott (2005) note that an increasing number of U.S. ﬁrms that trade (import and/or
export) are concentrated in the retail and wholesale sectors rather than the goods-producing
sector; Gereﬃ (1999) also notes the increasing role of retailers in global sourcing. It is also
possible to view the media backlash against Wal-Mart following the publicity about its high
import volume as a non-pecuniary ﬁxed cost. Finally, a competitive sector with constant
marginal cost could not survive in the presence of ﬁxed costs of setup unless this cost is
borne by the retailer.
To capture the retailer’s additional choice variable we introduce the variable θ ∈ {0,1},
which equals 0 if the input is purchased from domestic producers, or 1 if the input is imported.
Cost-minimization implies that the chain purchases the input domestically when kx < F
α0−α1
and imports it from oﬀshore producers when kx ≥ F
α0−α1. We assume that stand-alone stores
cannot be large enough to meet the condition for importing even if their input demand is
aggregated by a wholesaler.27 This implies that the contestable-market constraint remains
p ≤ α0 + h regardless of the chain’s input source. The marketing cost is independent of the
production location.
25Swenson (2005) oﬀers evidence from the U.S. Oﬀshore Assemby Program (OAP) suggesting that the
pattern OAP outsourcing is consistent with the presence of a ﬁxed cost, which she attributes to search and
product development.
26An estimated 40% of Wal-Mart’s revenue comes from its store brands (Petrovic and Hamilton (2005)).
27Because we want to highlight the role that a single chain can play in the import process, we abstract
away from the possibility that a wholesaler can aggregate demand from multiple small stores and contract
with a foreign producer. Such a wholesaler would simply function as an additional chain. We discuss the
consequences of allowing multiple chains in our concluding remarks.
17The chain’s maximization problem becomes
max
k,x,θ




subject to k ∈ [1,N]
x ≥ 0
θ ∈ {0,1}.
We omit the constraint that p ≤ α0+h because we have redeﬁned p(x) so that demand is zero
for higher prices. Since the choice of θ is discrete, to solve this problem the chain compares
its maximized proﬁt if it purchases the input from domestic suppliers with proﬁt from the
alternative case in which it purchases the input from foreign manufacturers. If θ = 1, i.e.,
if the chain imports the input, it always uses the convex marketing technology. Letting
(k∗
θ,x∗





1,1); the choice of θ depends on whether the increase in proﬁt from obtaining
a lower-price input fully oﬀsets the ﬁxed cost of importing F. For θ = 0, the solution is
identical to the case solved above, with only domestic suppliers available. The solution if
θ = 1 is nearly identical (using α = α1), with the exception that the contestable-market
constraint imposed by potential entry of stand-alone retailers uses α0, the (higher) domestic
input price, even if the chain retailer purchases input abroad for a lower marginal cost.
The solution is shown graphically in Figure 7. An interior solution (k∗
0,x∗
0) is shown at





1) is shown at the intersection of the dashed thick-set and thin
lines. Because α1 < α0, if the input is imported the chain does not need to be large enough
to use the convex marketing technology in order to be proﬁtable: it earns a positive variable
proﬁt per store even if k = 1. Therefore, conditional on θ = 1 (and therefore a sunk cost
F), for any level of sales per store x > 0 the chain chooses a chain size k > 1: an importing
retailer always has multiple stores. For x < xs, price does not fall as x increases because
18the contestable-market constraint binds, so increasing x unambiguously increases proﬁt per
store, and therefore increases the optimal size of the chain. For every value of x the chain
weighs the advantage of increasing its size to k > z
x, at which point it can beneﬁt from
the more eﬃcient convex marketing technology (but pay the higher chaining cost associated
with the larger chain size k), against the alternative of keeping k low and using the linear
marketing technology. Because the chain’s marginal cost is lower when it uses the foreign
input, the threshold value of x at which the chain sets k > z
x — and switches to the convex
marketing technology — is lower than in the case where the chain purchases its input from
domestic suppliers.
The curve x∗(k) also depends on θ, because the threshold value ¯ k (at which the contestable-
market constraint stops binding) falls when the chain imports the input. For low values of




We start by establishing that the optimal chain size conditional on the chain purchas-
ing input from oﬀshore producers is larger than the optimal chain size conditional on its
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0 = N.











be the diﬀerence, net of the ﬁxed cost of importing F, between the chain’s proﬁt conditional
on purchasing the input from oﬀshore producers (with the conditionally-optimal chain size
k∗
1, selling the conditionally-optimal number of units x∗
1 per store) and the chain’s proﬁt
conditional on purchasing the input domestically (with the conditionally optimal chain size
28If α1 is small enough, the contestable-market constraint will never bind for an importing chain.
19k∗
0, and selling x∗
0 per store). We suppress the parameter α0 in the second proﬁt function
because we treat it as a constant. Because G(·,·) is the diﬀerence between the conditional
optimized proﬁts, net of F, it depends only on the parameters of the model and not on any
decision variables. By construction, G > 0; G is not a function of F because this ﬁxed cost
cancels out a negative term in π(k∗
1,x∗
1,1). The optimal input source is θ∗ = 1 if and only if
G ≥ F.
3.3 Technological Change and Trade Liberalization
We can now analyze the eﬀect of an improvement in the chain’s technology (a rise in δ) on
imports. We continue to abstract away from the technology-investment decision and treat
the technology parameter δ as exogenous. Our ﬁrst result establishes that the decision to
purchase input from oﬀshore producers depends on δ: the chain only imports its input if its
technological advantage is suﬃciently large.
Result 1 (Technological Change). If F is not too high, there exists some δm < ∞ such
that:
1. The chain purchases the input domestically when δ < δm, and imports the input once
its chaining technology exceeds this level;
2. For δ ≥ δm, the chain’s size, units sold per store, total import volume (kx) and import
value (kxp(x)) all increase with δ.
Result 1, combined with our earlier discussion of the eﬀect of δ on chain size in the case
of domestic production, implies that if δ rises over time the chain eventually starts to import
its input. By Lemma 1, it also increases in size discretely at that point.29 This result holds
only if F is not too large; if the ﬁxed cost F of importing is too high, the variable-cost savings
29A discrete increase in the optimal chain size k∗ is mitigated by real-world frictions such as “time to
build” (Koeva (2000)), so we do not expect to see a sudden sharp increase in the number of Wal-Mart stores.
20from importing the input can never justify incurring the cost F. In that case, δm would be
inﬁnite and the input would be purchased domestically regardless the chain’s technology
parameter. We assume that δm > δc: the threshold for importing exceeds the threshold for
chaining.
Part 1 of Result 1 is consistent with the experience of Wal-Mart in the late 1980s and
early 1990s. Between 1985 and 1995, Wal-Mart’s chaining technology improved dramatically
with the introduction of “Retail Link,” an innovative distribution system connecting its
stores, distribution centers, headquarters and suppliers. Wal-Mart more than doubled in
size over this period, transitioning from a regional chain with 859 stores in 22 states to a
national chain with 1880 stores in 46 states. And, at the same time, Wal-Mart launched,
and then retreated from, a massive “Buy American” campaign.
Part 2 of Result 1 is also consistent with the empirical evidence. The simultaneous rise
in U.S. Wal-Mart sales and U.S. imports from China was shown in Figure 1. Over the period
1984-2004, Wal-Mart’s share of U.S. retail sales increased from 0.1% to 7.4%; imports from
China have grown at an even faster rate, and prices of clothes, toys and electronics — items
increasingly imported from China and other LDCs — have fallen considerably. Apparel
prices, for example, fell by 55% relative to the overall price level between 1980 and 2004,
and toy prices fell by 87% relative to the overall price level over this period.
To analyze the eﬀect of a reduction in tariﬀs on k∗ and x∗, we explicitly write the base
cost of a unit produced oﬀshore as e α1 + τ, with e α1 the production cost, and τ the import
tariﬀ (assume the transport cost is zero).
Result 2 (Trade Liberalization). If F is not too high, there is some τm < ∞ such that:
1. The chain purchases the input domestically when τ > τm, and imports the input once
the tariﬀ falls below this level;
2. τm is increasing in δ;
213. For τ ≤ τm, the chain’s size, units sold per store, total import volume and value all
increase as τ declines.
This result is a consequence of the ﬁxed cost of purchasing the input from oﬀshore
producers: this creates a threshold market size for oﬀshore production. As the cost advantage
of oﬀshore producers increases (with a decline in trade costs), the threshold market size
declines. Improvements in the chain’s technology increase its market size, raising the upper
bound on trade barriers that can support trade. Once τ falls below this upper bound (at
which point the chain begins to import, and increases discretely in size), any further trade
liberalization increases the chain’s size.
For τ ≤ τm, we decompose the eﬀect of lower trade barriers (a reduction in τ) on total



















This decomposition allows us to identify three distinct eﬀects:
1. Demand eﬀect: k · ∂x
∂τ. This is the “conventional” eﬀect, which works through the
increase in demand in a ﬁxed number of locations due to lower unit cost.
2. Expansion eﬀect: x· dk
dτ. This eﬀect works through the expansion of the chain. In our
simple model, stand-alone retailers do not import at all, while the chain sells imported
goods exclusively. More generally, as long as stand-alone retailers have a lower import
share than the chain, the expansion of the chain increases imports.
3. Scale eﬀect: k · ∂x
∂k
dk
dτ. As the chain expands, its unit marketing cost falls, which
further lowers its retail price and increases imports.
All three of these eﬀects work in the same direction. Together, they provide an alterna-
tive explanation for the “tariﬀ elasticity puzzle” of Yi (2003). Yi argues that the response
of trade volumes to tariﬀ reductions over the past two decades implies an implausibly high
22price elasticity of demand. Here, the existence and expansion of the chain ampliﬁes the
demand eﬀect. Because the expansion and scale eﬀects are of the same order as the demand
eﬀect, this ampliﬁcation can be quite large.
A further ampliﬁcation of the eﬀect of tariﬀs on imports can arise through the chaining
technology, and in particular, through the interaction between trade liberalization and tech-
nological change. This channel provides a complementary mechanism through which a tariﬀ
reduction can have not only an ampliﬁed eﬀect on imports, but one that increases over time,
consistent with the observation that the relationship between tariﬀ reductions and trade has
become more pronounced over time.
As implied by Results 1 and 2, if δ is very low the chain purchases its input domestically
regardless of τ. As the chain’s technology improves the range of values of τ for which the
chain chooses to import the input increases, and a small reduction in tariﬀ is increasingly
likely to shift the optimal input source from domestic to foreign manufacturers. Thus, the
improvements in Wal-Mart’s chaining technology and gradual reductions in tariﬀs may have
worked together to bring about the large increase in Chinese imports observed in the 1990s.
This technology-dependent tariﬀ threshold can also explain why Wal-Mart is perceived to
import not only more than stand-alone retailers, but also more than many smaller chains.
Once τ falls below τm(δ), further increases in δ interact with the falling level of τ to
increase imports at an increasing rate. The eﬀect of an increase in δ on the relationship




















23The following functional forms meet our assumptions:30









the ﬁrst derivatives of k∗ and x∗ with respect to the parameters δ and τ, when τ ≤ τm, are













































− k∗(x∗σ)2 > 0 by the second-order
conditions for a maximum (see Appendix A). This establishes that the ﬁrst two terms in
Equation (8) are negative. We show in Appendix A that the cross-partial terms are also
negative, so that the term
d2(k∗·x∗)
dδdτ is unambiguously negative: the sensitivity of imports to
tariﬀ reductions increases as the chaining technology improves. This also implies that the
eﬀect of a technological improvement on chain size and units sold per store is larger when the
chain imports the input (i.e., when α = α1) than when it purchases it domestically (α = α0).
A combination of a decline in trade costs and an improvement in Wal-Mart’s (and others’)
chaining technology could act together to increase both trade and chain size — with both
changes aﬀecting both outcomes. Indeed, the eﬀect of trade liberalization on imports was
small as long as the U.S. retail sector was relatively fragmented — in 1972, for example,
only 15% of retail stores belonged to chains, and only 6% to large chains (see Table 2). By
1992, when 33% of retail stores belonged to chains, and 17% to large chains — the available
30To ensure that S(·) is everywhere increasing, we assume that s > σNa
b . We also assume that s > h and
2(s−h)
σ > a
b to ensure that z > ¯ x.
24“chaining technology” having improved considerably over this period, with the introduction
of bar codes and better computer systems — imports from China and elsewhere increased
dramatically in response to small tariﬀ reductions.
Finally, we note that while our discussion focused on the eﬀect of a reduction in tariﬀs,
the analysis applies equally to other cost reductions. An increasing share of international
trade has shifted from ocean shipping, whose costs have been roughly constant since the
1950s, towards air transport, whose costs have declined sharply since the 1970s (Hummels
(1999)). Combined, these trends imply a decline in average shipping costs, which will have
the same eﬀect as a decline in tariﬀs in our model. The analysis also applies to reductions in
production costs. A decrease in the production cost e α1, for example due to learning-by-doing
or cost-reducing investment in human capital, induces chain expansion and thus ampliﬁes
the eﬀect on imports. A decrease in the value of the foreign currency (say, the yuan) which
would eﬀectively reduce the dollar value of e α1, would have the same eﬀect. Many have
argued in recent years that the yuan is undervalued. A revaluation of the yuan would, in
our model, amount to an increase in α1 and would slow imports from China — by increasing
their price, and also by reducing the optimal rate of Wal-Mart’s expansion.
4 Induced Technical Change
So far, we have treated δ as an exogenous parameter. In reality, however, a retailer has
a choice of technology level. Wal-Mart chose to invest in computers in its early years, in
the “Retail Link” software in the 1980s and 1990s, and more recently in RFID technology.
Other chains, notably Target and Walgreen’s, have made similarly large investments in
their respective chaining technologies, especially in the past decade. We show below that
endogenizing the retailer’s technology level further ampliﬁes the eﬀect of lower trade barriers
on imports.
To capture the retailer’s technology choice, we introduce a new function, I(δ), with
25I(0) = 0, I0 > 0, I00 > 0. That is, where we have previously used δ as a primitive reﬂecting
the chain’s advantage over other retailers, now the function I(·) is the primitive: only the
chain has access to this investment function, and it can use it to achieve any level of chaining
technology δ ≥ 0. To conserve on notation, we use the convention that if k = 1 and δ = 0,
c0(k)
δ = 0.
The chain’s maximization problem becomes
max
k,x,θ,δ




− θF − I(δ)




The new ﬁrst-order condition, with respect to δ, is
δ
2I
0(δ) = c(k), (9)
with the other ﬁrst-order conditions unaﬀected. The solution is shown graphically in the
(k,δ) plane in Figure 8. The thick-set solid line k∗(δ;τ1) is the solution, for a given τ1, to
the simultaneous equation problem (x∗(k),k∗(x)), taking δ as given. We showed earlier that
k∗(δ) = 1 for δ < δc: if it is suﬃciently costly for the chain to expand, it prefers to emulate a
stand-alone retailer. The optimal chain size increases discretely at δc and again at δm, when
the chain begins importing the input; for all other values of δ > δc, k∗(δ) increases smoothly
with δ. The thin curve δ∗(k) is the solution to Equation (9); it does not depend on either θ
(the import decision) or τ directly.
For all parameter values, there is a local maximum at (k∗,δ∗) = (1,0), at which the
26chain emulates a stand-alone store, and does not invest in chaining technology. Suﬃcient
conditions for an interior solution to exist as well are




Using the function I(δ) = i · δ2, where i > 0 is a constant, these conditions place upper
and lower bounds, respectively, on the parameter i. Given the two local maxima, the chain
compares proﬁts at the corner and interior solutions to determine which maximum is global.
Since π = 0 for the corner solution, the interior solution is a global maximum if and only if
it yields a positive proﬁt; for τ low enough, the interior solution dominates.
The dotted line k∗(δ;τ2) in Figure 8 shows how k∗(δ) responds to a reduction in tariﬀ.
Both δc and δm, the technology thresholds for chaining and imports, respectively, fall; and
k∗(δ;τ) increases for all values of δ ≥ δm. As in the earlier analysis with exogenous δ, a
decline in τ increases chain size. What is new here is that the eﬀect on k∗ can be decomposed
into two parts: holding δ ﬁxed, there is an increase in k∗(δ), as explained above. In addition,
because δ∗ is an increasing function of k, a decline in tariﬀs leads to higher investment in
chaining technology, which also increases k∗.
Endogenizing the chain’s technology level therefore adds a fourth component to the eﬀect
of lower trade barriers (a reduction in τ) on total imports:
4. Investment eﬀect: x · ∂k
∂δ
dδ
dτ. Lower trade barriers increase the beneﬁt of chaining by
increasing proﬁt per store for a ﬁxed value of δ; but because the beneﬁt of investing in
chaining increases with the size of the chain, δ also increases, raising further the size
of the chain.
There is a parallel between the investment eﬀect and the result of “directed technical
change” in recent models of endogenous technological change (see Acemoglu (2002a)). Im-
31Technically, k∗(δc) is set-valued, k∗(δc) = {1,k(δ;τ)}; we save on notation by assuming that when δ = δc
the retailer will set k∗(δc) > 1.
27ports are an input of the chain retailer; as this input becomes cheaper the chain has an
incentive to invest in technology that takes advantage of the cheaper input. In our context
the technology takes the form of improvements in the organization and logistics of the chain,
which complements the increasingly-abundant cheap imports.
5 Product Cycle
In this section we generalize our model by adding many potential production locations in
order to analyze the relationship among trade policy, chain size and the product cycle. We
show that the product cycle — the migration of production from one country to the next —
is accelerated by the existence of the chain, and adds another layer to the eﬀect of a tariﬀ
reduction on import volume.32
Assume an inﬁnite number of possible production locations parameterized by the pair
(α,F) ∈ Φ where Φ is a compact subset of <++ × <+. As before, α is the marginal cost
of production (inclusive of tariﬀ) and F is the retailer’s ﬁxed cost of importing from the
country; the domestic location is the only one where F = 0.33
The retail chain chooses the production location to maximize proﬁt. We write the




where G(·,·) is deﬁned in Equation (7), and the discrete variable θ is replaced by a continuous
choice represented by (α,F) ∈ Φ. Deﬁne e F(α) as the lowest value F for given value of
α. The solution to the retailer’s optimization problem is restricted to the set of points
32The product cycle usually refers to the process starting from a good’s introduction in an industrialized
country to the migration of its production, ﬁrst to other industrialized countries and eventually to developing
countries. Our context is one where the good is mature and so the product cycle here refers to the migration
of production from one developing country to another.
33Alternatively, the domestic location may have two production options, one of which is domestic contract
manufacturing with some small ﬁxed cost.
28{(α, e F(α))} ⊂ Φ. Since F = 0 only for the domestic location, the solution is further
restricted to locations with α ≤ α0. To simplify the exposition, assume that Φ is strictly
convex. This implies that e F(α) is downward-sloping and convex in α. The function e F(α) is
shown as the dotted curve in Figure 9.
We can also represent G(α;δ) in Figure 9. By deﬁnition, G(α0,δ) ≡ 0 for all values of δ.
By the envelope theorem, ∂G
∂α < 0 and ∂G
∂δ > 0 for interior solutions when α > α0, so G(α,δ)
is downward-sloping and becomes steeper, rotating clockwise about the point (α0,0), as δ
increases.
In Figure 9 we show the curves G(α,δ) for three diﬀerent values of δ, with δ1 < δ2 < δ3.
The optimum for each value of δ (which is again treated as exogenous) is the point on the
e F(α) curve that maximizes the vertical gap between the curves G(α,δ1) and e F(α). For low
values of δ, such as δ = δ1, the optimum is point A: domestic production. When δ reaches a
suﬃciently high level, production moves to a foreign location; at δ = δ2, the retailer purchases
input from the location denoted by point B. As the chaining technology improves further
(δ = δ3), production moves to another location denoted by point C. As a possible example
of this sort of shift, India is currently Wal-Mart’s largest-growing supplier, with exports of
$1.5 billion through Wal-Mart (Augustine, Sieber, and Uy (2005)). Gereﬃ (1999) counts
three or four major shifts of oﬀshore apparel production since the 1950s: to Japan; to the
“Big Three” Asian producers (Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea); and from the Big Three
to China and a few other Southeast Asian countries (including Sri Lanka), with several more
countries, including Vietnam, expected to emerge as large producers in the near future.34
We can also use Figure 9 to analyze the eﬀect of a uniform tariﬀ reduction. Suppose
that all locations (except the domestic location) have the same tariﬀ τ, and redeﬁne the
horizontal axis of Figure 9 to be e α = α − τ. The eﬀect of a decrease in τ in this setting is
similar to an increase in the chain’s eﬃciency δ. If the chain initially purchased the input
34There is also evidence that diﬀerently-sized U.S. retailers import from diﬀerent countries and regions;
see Gereﬃ (1994).
29from domestic producers (i.e., starting from point A), a uniform reduction in tariﬀ would
have the standard eﬀect of moving production abroad; but if initial production were in a
foreign location, such as B, a uniform tariﬀ reduction would move the chain’s optimal source
to a diﬀerent country, such as C. A uniform reduction in tariﬀs can therefore hurt some
trading partners while helping others. This result could explain the empirical observation
that China’s share of U.S. imports has increased — and Latin America’s has fallen — despite
broadly similar tariﬀ treatment in the 1980s and 1990s (see, e.g., Moreira (2004)). A high
uniform tariﬀ that applies to all non-domestic producers therefore protects not only domestic
manufacturers, but also incumbents that are “close” to the domestic market on the e F(α)
locus.35
Endogenizing the chain’s technology parameter δ in the presence of many potential
production locations adds yet another eﬀect of a tariﬀ reduction on import volume. As in
the previous section, a reduction in the tariﬀ τ increases the chain’s optimal choice of δ.
This, in turn, rotates the curve G(α,δ) clockwise, moving the optimal source of input to a
“further” country — in other words, lowering the unit production cost e α, which increases







dτ. A uniform reduction in tariﬀ for all trading partners
increases the chain’s investment in chaining technology, which, by increasing market
size, moves the optimal input source to a country with lower unit costs, further in-
creasing proﬁt per store and inducing further increases in the size of the chain and
sales per store.
35The movement of industries across countries may be partially mitigated by the importance of physical
distance. Moreira (2004) reports that from 1990-2002, over four per cent of world market share in manu-
facturing were lost to China in Brazil, in the Mercosur countries, and the Andean countries compared to
Mexico’s loss of 0.3%. Manufacturing in the East Asian countries lost 8.1% to China. Evans and Harrigan
(2005) argue that for goods where timeliness matters, physical distance is paramount. They ﬁnd that, from
1990-98, imports of “more-often-replenished” apparel goods to the U.S. grew more quickly for proximate
countries like Mexico than far-away countries like China, implying that for some industries, the importance
of physical distance may dominate the eﬀect discussed in this section.
306 Concluding Remarks
Our goal in this paper has been to uncover the link between recent trends in the U.S. retail
sector and trends in the location of manufacturing jobs and the volume of imports. We
rely on the interaction between scale economies in the retail sector and scale economies in
the import process to generate a two-way relationship between import volume and chain
size, and show that this interaction has implications for trade volume and the sensitivity
of imports to tariﬀ reductions. Technological innovations in the retail sector increase chain
size and, by increasing market size, also increase imports. Likewise, reductions in the cost of
merchandise (due, for example, to tariﬀ reductions or currency devaluation) increase both
imports and the size of the dominant retailer. When the retailer’s level of investment in the
chaining technology is endogenized, we obtain a result akin to “directed technical change”
in that the retailer’s investment in chaining technology increases as imports become cheaper
and more abundant.
Many observers (e.g., McKinsey Global Institute (2001)) have noted the retail sector’s
high productivity growth rate in the 1990s relative to the rest of the economy. Wal-Mart
has been cited as an important source of the productivity increase. Wal-Mart’s transition
to cheaper inputs provides an alternative explanation for its high observed productivity; as
a matter of accounting, cheaper inputs may be indistinguishable from superior technology
in productivity calculations. Our contribution in this paper is to highlight the interaction
between these two explanations. Wal-Mart, as the canonical example of a large retail chain,
serves as a conduit for imports and its technological advantage is a necessary ingredient for
enlarging the market for these imports.
While our discussion has centered on the eﬀect of a decline in tariﬀs on chain size and
import volume, the feedback eﬀect the chain exerts on imports is also present when foreign
production costs fall. Any decline in the cost of production in China, for example due to
investment in human or physical capital, relaxation of regulation, or learning, increases the
optimal size of the retail chain, and so increases imports not only through the direct demand
31eﬀect, but also by expanding the chain and its level of investment in “chaining” technology.
Our model abstracts from competition between chains to highlight the eﬀect of increasing
returns when there is a single chain competing against stand-alone “fringe” ﬁrms. If there
are multiple ﬁrms with access to chaining technology, and their unconstrained sizes sum
to more than the number of available retail locations, interesting strategic considerations
arise. First, the price constraint faced by a chain store may be determined not by potential
entry of a stand-alone retailer but by potential expansion of an existing competing chain. In
addition, from a modeling perspective, timing starts to matter. In the one-chain model, the
retailer’s choices — chain size, units sold per store (alternatively, retail price), the location of
production, and possibly the level of investment in technology — are treated as simultaneous;
the true timing of these decisions does not matter since there is no strategic element in
the retailer’s decision-making. With multiple chains, however, simultaneous and sequential
choices will yield very diﬀerent outcomes. Extending the model to address these issues may
yield further insights into the equilibrium distribution of chain size and the relationship
between the size of chains and import volumes.
The implications of our model extend to a situation with many goods or industries.
Suppose that the chain retailer sells many goods, which vary with respect to the gap in unit
production costs between domestic and foreign manufacturers. This variable gap may reﬂect
diﬀerent degrees of “maturity” of the goods or the extent to which foreign producers have
“caught up” with domestic producers. When the chain is small, only industries with a suﬃ-
ciently large gap in unit production costs are located oﬀshore, with the remaining industries
producing domestically. As the chain expands — e.g., in response to trade liberalization —
more and more industries move oﬀshore. The pace of this oﬀshoring of production is directly
related to the response of chain size to trade liberalization, which, as before, is greater the
better the chain’s technology.
The trend towards foreign outsourcing of production has been mentioned with regularity
recently in the popular press, as have reports of Wal-Mart’s low wages. An extension of our
32model suggests a mechanism through which these two issues are related. In a general-
equilibrium framework with skilled and unskilled workers, increased trade with China and
other developing countries reduces the relative wage of unskilled workers. If the chain retailer
employs unskilled service workers, this wage decline operates as a cost reduction and creates
an incentive to expand the chain. Chain expansion leads to more imports and oﬀshoring
of production, depressing the unskilled wage further. Improvements in chaining technology
therefore reduce the bargaining power of unskilled labor, amplifying the eﬀect of technological
change on the size of the chain. Note that this is a diﬀerent mechanism than the usual
theories of skilled-biased technological change (see, e.g. Acemoglu (2002b), Autor, Katz,
and Krueger (1998)); in our model, technological change aﬀects the labor market but it is
by way of trade.
Our analysis focuses on the retailer’s choice of the location of private-label production
facilities, since half of Wal-Mart’s imports are made directly through contract manufacturers
oﬀshore. The other half, however, is produced oﬀshore not because of any explicit decision
by Wal-Mart, but because large-scale suppliers from the U.S. and Europe have found it
proﬁtable to move their production facilities oﬀshore. Our results would likely carry over to
that setting. If the cost of linking to a foreign contract manufacturer is borne not by the
retailer but by the supplier (such as General Electric or Proctor and Gamble), market size
should again play an important role in the decision. But there is one key diﬀerence. In this
case the ﬁxed cost of importing implies an imperfectly-competitive manufacturing sector.
The details of the results may depend on how this competition is modeled. One interesting
implication of such a set-up that is diﬀerent from our model is that once the decision is made
to move production oﬀshore, the supplier sells its lower-cost product to all retailers, including
stand-alone stores. This implies that the expansion of the chain, by increasing aggregate
market size through lower prices, creates an externality for smaller stores. Consumers in
markets not served by the chain could therefore still beneﬁt from the chain’s expansion.
In conclusion, we note that our model highlights a mechanism not usually mentioned
33in popular discourse. There is a common perception that Wal-Mart and trade with China
are related. But the discussion of the relationship between Wal-Mart’s growth and import
growth tends to focus on Wal-Mart’s monopsony power implied in the often-made claim
that Wal-Mart “forces” suppliers to move production overseas in order to cut costs. In a
model with increasing marginal cost, a monopsonist who cannot perfectly price-discriminate
depresses production to extract a lower input price. Such a model counter-intuitively implies
that in the absence of Wal-Mart and other large chains, imports would have grown at a rate
even faster than the one we have observed over the past two decades. While we do not
deny the importance of issues arising from Wal-Mart’s market power beyond its role as
seller, discussions of such issues are taking place without the beneﬁt of formal analysis. Our
model is a starting point from which to bring economic analysis into this important debate
surrounding Wal-Mart’s role in an increasingly-globalized setting.
34A Proofs
Existence of Equilibrium. The chain retailer solves the following problem
max
k,x
π(k,x) = kx(p(x) − α) − min{hkx,S(kx)} −
c(k)
δ
subject to k ∈ [1,N]
x ≥ 0
where p = α + h for x ≤ xs and p(x) is the unconstrained price given by the market inverse
demand function for x > xs.
As noted in the text (Section 3.1), a local maximum (k,x) = (1,xs) exists and guarantees
zero proﬁt using the linear marketing technology, for all δ > 0. If a solution (k∗,x∗) exists
such that k∗ · x∗ > z it must satisfy the ﬁrst-order conditions






0(x)x + p(x) − α − S
0(kx)) = 0, (11)
along with second-order conditions. If a solution to Equations (10) and (11) with kx > z —
when the chain is large enough to proﬁtably use the convex marketing technology — exists
and yields a positive proﬁt, this solution is the retailer’s optimum. Alternatively, (1,xs) is
the global optimum whenever a solution to Equations (10) and (11) does not exist or when
a solution exists but yields negative proﬁt. Which solution dominates depends on the value
of δ.
Consider the case when the retailer uses the convex marketing technology and the price
constraint does not bind. In this case, p(x) is downward-sloping (p0(x) < 0). Let k∗(x) be
the solution to the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to k, Equation (10), and let x∗(k) be
the solution to the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to x, Equation (11). A local maximum,
(k∗,x∗), simultaneously solves the Equation (10) and (11), along with second-order conditions
35deﬁned below. Graphically, this is the intersection of x∗(k) and k∗(x) in the (k,x) plane (see
Figures 5 and 6).




































One way to interpret these conditions is as a set of restrictions on the magnitude of S00(·),
or the degree of increasing-returns in the chain’s marketing technology. The marketing
component of marginal cost, S0(kx), falls when either k or x increases; an interior optimum
can only exist if it does not fall too rapidly. Equation (13) bounds the extent of increasing
returns due to increasing x relative to the decline in marginal revenue from increasing x,
holding k constant. Equation (12) bounds the extent of increasing returns due to increasing
k (now holding x constant) relative to the increased chaining cost entailed in increasing k.
Equation (14) bounds the extent of increasing returns when x and k are allowed to co-vary.
Since x and k move together (see below), for some functional-form assumptions this condition
is suﬃcient and implies the previous two.
An interior intersection of k∗(x) and x∗(k) occurs if:










To see that the ﬁrst condition is satisﬁed, from Equation (6), check that for k = 0, x∗ > 0;
and from Equation (10), for x = 0, k∗ = 0. For the second condition, diﬀerentiate the two













The the numerator of Equation (15) is positive by second-order condition (12). For x < x∗(k),
πx > 0 so the denominator is also positive and
dk∗(x)
dx > 0. For x > x∗(k), πx < 0, but in
the neighborhood of x∗ πx is not too negative, so the denominator remains positive. As
x increases beyond some level, πx becomes suﬃciently negative that
dk∗(x)
dx turns negative.
By the second-order condition (13) and concavity of S(·), both the numerator and the
denominator of Equation (16) are negative, so
dx∗(k)
dk > 0.
The third condition, 1
dk∗(x)/dx >
dx∗(k)























The term on the left-hand side is positive by second-order condition (14). The right-hand
side is negative for x < x∗(k), equals zero at x = x∗(k) and turns positive for x > x∗(k). As
above, in the neighborhood of x∗ the RHS term is not too positive, and the inequality holds.
The above shows that an interior solution exists to the retailer’s optimization problem
when the price it charges is not constrained by potential entrants and it uses the convex
marketing technology. If a solution to the unconstrained problem exists but yields negative
proﬁt, then the retailer will prefer to set x∗ = xs and k∗ = 1. This occurs, for instance, when
δ is very low.
The ﬁnal possibility is that the price constraint binds so that x∗ = xs but that k∗x∗ > z





(where ¯ k is the
chain size beyond which the price constraint no longer binds), solves:
















Comparative Statics with Domestic Production. First, we show that for δ ≥ δc, dk∗
dδ > 0 and
dx∗
dδ > 0. Note that for δ ≥ δc, k∗ ≥ ¯ k so the chain is operating in the region where k∗x∗ > z,
i.e., it is using the convex marketing technology. For the case of domestic production, the
optimum (x∗,k∗) satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order conditions:
πx = k(p
0(x)x + p(x) − α − S
0(kx)) = 0



















































































38where |H| is the determinant of the Hessian matrix,






















and, at the optimum, p0(x)x + p(x) − α − S0(kx) = 0.
By the second-order condition, |H| > 0. Thus, dk∗
dδ > 0 and dx∗
dδ > 0.
Proof of Lemma 1. Deﬁne Γθ(k) to be the marginal beneﬁt of expanding the chain condi-
tional on an input source θ ∈ {0,1} and choosing the optimal number of units to sell in each



















θ(k)) − (1 − θ)α0 − θα1 − h) if kx ≤ z
x∗
θ(k)(p(x∗
θ(k)) − (1 − θ)α0 − θα1 − S0(k · x∗
θ(k))) otherwise.
An interior solution k∗
θ — denoting the optimal chain size conditional on the input source
— equates Γθ(k) with the marginal cost of expanding the chain,
c0(k)
δ . Since the marginal
cost of chain expansion is increasing in k, for interior solutions it is suﬃcient to show that
Γ1(k) > Γ0(k).
If kx < z, the chain uses the linear marketing technology, so x∗(k) = xs and p(x) =
α0 + h; this implies that Γ0(k) = 0 but Γ1(k) = (α0 − α1)xs > 0.
If kx > z but k < ¯ k, then x∗(k) = xs and p(x) = α0 +h still, so Γ0(k) = (h−S0(kxs))xs
while Γ1(k) = (α0 − α1 + h − S0(kxs))xs > Γ0(k).
If kx > z and k ≥ ¯ k, then the contestable-market constraint does not bind, so x and p are
unconstrained. By the envelope theorem, dπ
dα = dΓ
dα = −x∗
θ(k). Since the ﬁrst-order condition
39(6) implies that x∗
1(k) > x∗
0(k) in the unconstrained optimization problem, Γ1(k) > Γ0(k),
and k∗
1 > k∗
0 for all interior k∗
0.
Finally, since k∗
1 > 1 for all x > 0, but k∗
0 = 1 for x ≤ xs, and since x∗(k) > 0 regardless
of θ, whenever k∗
0 = 1 then k∗
1 > 1. Also, since N is the upper bound for chain size, whenever
k∗
0 = N then k∗
1 = N.
Proof of Result 1.1. To conserve on notation, we write G(δ) taking α1 as a constant. We
need to show that there is some value δm < ∞ such that F > G(δ) for δ < δm and F < G(δ)
for δ > δm.
First, note that for values of δ < δc, G(δ) = (α0−α1)xs. Our assumption that ¯ x < F
α0−α1
guarantees that 0 < G(δ) < F for δ < δc.
Second, note that for values of δ such that k∗





δ2 > 0 (by the enve-
lope theorem and Lemma 1), so the beneﬁt of importing increases with the ﬁrm’s technology
parameter (for interior values of k). Also, for values of δ such that k∗
1(δ) = N but k∗
0(δ) < N,













dδ > 0). For values of δ such that k∗
0(δ) = k∗
1(δ) = N, dG
dδ = 0. Deﬁne
δN ≡ min{δ : k
∗
0(δ) = N}.
Since δm is deﬁned by G(δm) = F, such a threshold exists if F < G(δN).
Proof of Results 2.1 and 2.2. We need to show that there is some value τm < ∞ such that
F > G(e α1 + τ,δ) for τ > τm and F < G(e α1 + τ,δ) for τ < τm.
By construction, G(e α1 +τ,δ) is positive whenever τ < α0 − e α1, which holds by assump-
tion; and limτ→(α0−e α1) G(e α1 + τ,δ) = 0. By the envelope theorem,








40so as τ decreases, G gets larger, reaching a maximum (for a given δ) at τ = 0.
Deﬁne τm by G(e α1 + τm,δ) ≡ F. For F < G(e α1 + 0,δ), there exists τm ∈ (0,α0 − e α1)
such that G(δ, e α1 + τ) < F if and only if τ > τm.







Since the numerator is positive (see Result 1.1) and the denominator is negative, dτm
dδ > 0.
Proof of Results 1.2 and 2.3. When production has moved oﬀshore, we replace α with ˜ α1+τ,
and write the ﬁrst order conditions as:
πx = k(p
0(x)x + p(x) − (e α1 + τ) − S
0(kx)) = 0




















































which, by Cramer’s Rule, gives


















































δ2 k(p00(x)x + 2p0(x) − kS00(kx))




























At the optimum, this expression simpliﬁes since p0(x)x + p(x) − (e α1 + τ) − S0(kx) = 0.
By the second-order condition, |H| > 0, so dk∗
dτ < 0, dx∗
dτ < 0, and dk∗
dδ > 0, dx∗
dδ > 0.
Therefore, total import volume increases with δ and falls with τ:
d(k∗x∗)
dτ < 0 and
d(k∗x∗)
dδ > 0.
Import value also moves in the same direction:
d(k∗x∗p(x∗))
dτ





= k∗(p(x∗) + x∗p0(x∗))dx∗
dδ + x∗p(x∗)dk∗
dδ > 0.
Derivation of Cross-Partials d2k∗
dτdδ and d2x∗
dτdδ. To evaluate the cross-partial terms, we apply
Young’s Theorem, d2k∗
dτdδ = d2k∗
dδdτ (and similarly for x∗).











When δ increases, k∗ and x∗ both increase, raising the absolute value of the numerator
(which remains negative). The denominator falls, but remains positive, as long as the second-
order conditions are satisﬁed, so for interior solutions, d2k∗
dδdτ < 0: the better is the chaining
technology, the larger is the impact of trade liberalization on chain size.












when τ falls. Since dk∗
dτ < 0 and dx∗
dτ < 0, the numerator increases when τ falls; the denomina-




We use BLS price indices for the years 1984-2003 to compute apparel CPI inﬂation in 23 geo-
graphic markets (MSAs) (denoted ∆Pit) as the year-to-year log change in each MSA’s apparel
CPI. The BLS price indices can be obtained from the BLS web site, http://www.bls.gov/cpi/.
The MSAs used in the analysis are: Anchorage; Atlanta; Boston-Brockton-Nashua; Chicago-
Gary-Kenosha; Cincinnati-Hamilton; Cleveland-Akron; Dallas-Fort Worth; Denver-Boulder-
Greeley; Detroit-Ann Arbor-Flint; Honolulu; Houston-Galveston-Brazoria; Kansas City; Los
Angeles-Riverside-Orange County; Miami-Fort Lauderdale; Milwaukee-Racine; Minneapolis-
St. Paul; Philadelphia-Wilmington-Atlantic City; Pittsburgh; Portland-Salem; St. Louis;
San Diego; San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose; Seattle-Tacoma-Bremerton.37
We also compute Wal-Mart’s market share in each MSA each year, denoted WMshareit,
as the ratio of the number of existing Wal-Mart stores in the MSA to the number of all retail
establishments specializing in apparel or “general merchandise” sales. The relevant number
of retail establishments is computed by adding up the number of establishments across all
counties within each MSA for SIC codes 5300 (general merchandise) and 5600 (apparel) for
36Once δ reaches a suﬃciently high value, k∗ = N and x∗ = a−α1−τ
2b+σN . Declines in τ from that point on do
not aﬀect k∗, but x∗ continues to increase, albeit at a constant rate.
37The results are not sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of the New York-Northern New Jersey-Long
Island MSA, which had no Wal-Mart stores throughout the period.
431985-1997, and for NAICS codes 452 and 448 thereafter, from County Business Patterns.38
The number of existing Wal-Mart stores in each MSA each year come from available
historical lists of Wal-Mart store locations. For 1985-1993 we use the annual publication
Directory of Discount Stores published by Chain Store Guides; for 1994-2003 we use the
Wal-Mart editions of the road atlas published by Rand McNally, which contain complete
store lists (see Basker (2005a,b) for details on the data set construction). We supplement
these lists with data from press releases, available on Wal-Mart’s web site, about more recent
store openings.39
Finally, we obtain the apparel import price index from the BLS web site, http://www.bls.gov/mxp/.
We use the import price index for Standard International Trade Classiﬁcation (SITC) code
84, and for end-use classiﬁcation code 400. We compute the import inﬂation rate (denoted
∆P m
t ) for both indices using December-to-December log changes in the value of the index.
38Despite the shift from SIC to NAICS after 1997, we ﬁnd no break in the numbers of estab-
lishments before and after this shift, suggesting that the mapping from SIC to NAICS is fairly
straightforward for these two classiﬁcations. County Business Patterns data can be obtained from
http://www.census.gov/epcd/cbp/view/cbpview.html.
39The press releases are available from http://www.walmartstores.com/wmstore/wmstores/HomePage.jsp.
Special care needs to be taken using them, however, since new openings, store renovations, and conversions
of “discount stores” to “supercenters” are often not distinguished in the releases. To circumvent this
problem we match all press release data against the list of existing stores to ensure that we do not double
count stores.
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48Table 1. Regression Results for Consumer Price Inﬂation
SITC Import Inﬂation End-Use Import Inﬂation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆P m
t
0.4331 0.3036 0.5123 0.3657
(0.0722)*** (0.0848)*** (0.0687)*** (0.0835)***
(0.0439)*** (0.0505)*** (0.0423)*** (0.0502)***












Observations 437 437 437 437
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, respectively: unclustered, clustered by MSA,
clustered by year. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
Table 2. Growth of Retail Chains, 1948-1997a
Large Chains’ Share
Chains’ Share of All of All Chains’
Firms Stores Sales Firms Stores Sales
1948 9.2% 29.6% 27.2% 41.6%
1954 9.7% 30.1% 26.5% 41.8%
1958 10.2% 33.7% 27.5% 42.4%
1963 2.85% 12.9% 36.6% 0.44% 31.8% 43.2%
1967 2.16% 12.5% 39.8% 0.60% 37.6% 46.7%
1972 2.62% 15.2% 45.2% 0.68% 40.2% 55.8%
1982 3.24% 20.9% 52.3% 0.74% 45.5% 56.5%
1992 4.95% 33.6% 58.2% 1.02% 51.5% 58.8%
1997b 5.12% 37.5% 61.2% 1.32% 56.6% 61.0%
Source: authors’ calculations from Census of Business
(various years) and Census of Retail Trade (various years)
a Chains include multi-unit retailers with more than one
unit; large chains include chains with 101+ stores for
1948-1972, 100+ stores in 1982-1997
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Figure 2. Wal-Mart’s Growth: Stores and Average Sales per Store, 1985-2004
50Figure 3. Marketing Technologies
Figure 4. Determination of x∗(k)
51Figure 5. Equilibrium Chain Size and Quantity for Low δ
Figure 6. Equilibrium Chain Size and Quantity for High δ
52Figure 7. Equilibrium Chain Size and Quantity: Domestic vs. Foreign Production
Figure 8. Endogenous Chaining Technology
53Figure 9. Location of Production and Chaining Technology
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